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Social Solidarity  
 
Abstract: This article explores the concept of social solidarity by elaborating on five 
propositions about mutually-supportive social relationships. These five propositions 
are that social solidarity was a key issue for the founding figures of the discipline of 
sociology in the nineteenth century; that this sociological interest in social solidarity 
has continued down to the present day; that in the development of sociological 
analyses of social solidarity there has also been fruitful engagement with 
neighbouring disciplines; that social solidarity can sometimes be associated with 
social problems as well as with desirable social outcomes; and, that the nature and 
causes of social solidarity are matters of important on-going debate. 
 
 
Proposition 1: Social solidarity was a key issue for the founding figures of the 
discipline of sociology in the nineteenth century. Discussion of social solidarity was 
prominent in the writings of the founding figures of sociology, who were all in 
different ways concerned with the bases on which people participate in mutually-
supportive social relationships. This is most obvious in the writings of Emile 
Durkheim, whose book The Division of Labour in Society (Durkheim 1984), first 
published in 1893, was structured around the distinction between mechanical and 
organic solidarity. This distinction was central to Durkheim’s argument that all 
societies need some mechanism to hold their members together, and that this 
mechanism changes over time. Durkheim was not  the first person to identify what 
came to be known as ‘the problem of order’ (Parsons 1968), that is, the problem of 
explaining the basis on which individuals come together as members of societies in a 
more or less orderly and regular fashion. What his solution to this problem offered 
was a radical departure from what had gone before. Durkheim accepted that in some 
societies the regularity of social life could be explained by the actions of a strong state 
enforcing repressive legal arrangements, but he argued that such a system could not 
function effectively in modern societies in which a specialised division of labour and 
a corresponding degree of differentiation among individuals had developed. 
Paradoxically, social solidarity in modern societies needs to accommodate to this 
development of individual differences.  
 
In addition to advancing his critique of the pre-sociological solution to the problem of 
order framed in terms of a strong state that had been advanced by Thomas Hobbes in 
the seventeenth century in Leviathan (Hobbes 1968), Durkheim was also keen to 
dispute the arguments of two fellow pioneers of nineteenth-century sociology, Herbert 
Spencer and Ferdinand Tönnies. Durkheim deemed Spencer’s work inadequate 
because it placed too much emphasis on people calculating and pursuing their 
individual self-interest. In Durkheim’s view, self-interest can provide only a very 
limited and unstable basis for the development of common bonds with others, because 
it would be foolhardy to place trust in the co-operation of others whose sole motive 
was what they stood to gain personally from the arrangement. Instead, Durkheim 
insisted that there needed to be a moral framework within which social and economic 
relationships take place, and the underpinning morality of this arrangement is in a 
modern society one of respect for other people, what he called ‘the cult of the person 
and individual dignity’ (1984: 333), which is sometimes translated as ‘the cult of the 
individual’. Despite the fact that modern societies are characterised by increasing 
individual differences, they can achieve orderliness because social relationships take 
place in a moral framework of mutual respect, which places limits on the extent to 
which members of that society pursue narrowly self-interested agendas.  
 
This position also led Durkheim to critique the writings of Tönnies, who saw modern 
societies as increasingly conflictual as old bases of collective identification (such as 
ties to kinship groups and local traditions)  
were eroded by social and geographical mobility. Tönnies framed his arguments in 
terms of past social arrangements being more organic in contrast to modern ones 
which he considered merely mechanical. Durkheim’s analysis made use of these 
terms but characterised the situation as the other way round (Kivisto 1998: 95), and it 
is this characterisation that has stuck. National differences in traditions of theorising 
are evident here. Durkheim epitomised the French tradition in which social solidarity 
is analysed at the level of whole societies, whereas Tönnies and other German writers 
focused attention at lower levels of abstraction and were as much concerned with 
conflict as they were with solidarity. Karl Marx, for example, was primarily 
concerned with the phenomenon of social solidarity as it was expressed among 
members of competing social classes, while Max Weber highlighted the ways in 
which social solidarity was frequently linked to social identities among specific parts 
of social classes, such as skilled workers, or along ethnic or religious lines. Another 
German, Georg Simmel, directed attention to even more micro levels of analysis, 
citing small secret societies as an example of social organizations in which solidarity 
is most intense. Although these classical sociologists approached solidarity from very 
different starting points, recent reassessments have shown that important elements in 
them are complementary (Lockwood 1992; Crow 2002). 
 
Proposition 2: Sociological interest in social solidarity has continued down to the 
present day. The issue of solidarity to which the classical sociologists devoted much 
attention continues to confront modern sociologists. Alain Touraine, for example, has 
asked Can We Live Together? (Touraine 2000). This age-old question needs to be 
posed afresh in contemporary circumstances because the way in which the answers of 
the classical sociologists were framed may no longer convince as social relationships 
have evolved. Touraine is particularly interested in the development of other bases of 
social movements besides those representing social classes. The green movement and 
the feminist movement, for example, draw their respective support from more than 
one social class, and the solidarity to be found among such movements cannot readily 
be accounted for in terms of members’ shared class interests. Touraine also 
researched the Solidarity movement in Poland (Touraine et al. 1983), which in the 
1980’s brought together citizens from across Polish society. It was an organization 
that by 1989 had played a leading role in bringing about the demise of the Communist 
system in that country (De Nevers, 2003: ch.3), although its unity proved impossible 
to sustain as it moved from being an opposition movement to a party of government. 
 
Another contemporary theorist of social solidarity is Ulrich Beck, whose writings on 
the theme of individualization have been remarkably influential. Beck’s argument is 
that the development of modern societies, and in particular the development of 
welfare states, has changed the nature of risks to which citizens are subject (Beck 
1992). The greater levels of material security enjoyed by modern citizens compared to 
those that prevailed in earlier historical periods have freed individuals from ties to 
family and local community, that is, from a situation characterised by ‘the obligation 
of solidarity’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 88). Beck’s analysis thus fits into the 
tradition of writing that portrays the decline of traditional social solidarity as a 
corollary of modernisation, and although he has speculated on the potential for new 
forms of solidarity to emerge, for example around the idea of cosmopolitanism (Beck 
1999: 15), his overall theme is that fixed bases on which solidarity can be built are 
increasingly scarce. This reflects the unsettling influence of global forces on key 
aspects of life such as work, and also the enhancement of individual reflexivity in the 
contemporary period as people become more aware of the failure of modernity to 
deliver on many of its most ambitious promises.   
 
Beck’s position should not be confused with that of communitarianism, from which 
he is keen to distance himself because of what he regards as its backward-looking 
politics. For Beck, the aspiration to revive past community structures is a project that 
is bound to fail because the social world has moved on. There is a parallel here to 
Durkheim’s critique of those writers such as Tönnies who sought to preserve 
traditional social arrangements that modern developments had eroded. 
Communitarian ideas have been influential in a number of variants, but particularly 
noteworthy is the theme of the fall and prospective rise of community in the work of 
Robert Putnam. Putnam’s book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community traces the decline of social solidarity in the United States from 
a high point in the mid-twentieth century, and analyses this shift in terms of social 
capital which, he argues, can take two forms, ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ (Putnam 2000: 
22-3). Social capital is strongest where trust between members of communities is 
most well-established, and the challenge of promoting levels of trust in communities 
is one of the most urgent facing contemporary societies. Critics have rightly 
questioned whether findings relating to the USA provide an adequate basis for 
broader generalization, but Putnam argues that comparative analysis of major 
advanced societies shows that common trends can be identified. Long-term decline in 
membership of and involvement in formal organizations such as political parties, 
trade unions and churches is widely recognised, but running counter to this is a 
pattern of ‘increases in the relative importance of informal, fluid, personal forms of 
social connection, what Rothstein calls “solidaristic individualism”’ (Putnam 2002: 
411). Such patterns are less easily measured than more objective facts such as rates of 
trade union membership, as Liz Spencer and Ray Pahl imply in their reference to 
friendship networks as ‘hidden solidarities’ (Spencer and Pahl 2006), but they are 
where attention in contemporary research is increasingly focused.  
 
Proposition 3: In the development of sociological analyses of social solidarity there 
has also been fruitful engagement with neighbouring disciplines.  Durkheim’s 
ambition to establish a distinctively sociological analysis required him to develop 
critiques of ideas drawn from economic, political, philosophical and psychological 
traditions. Nevertheless, the way in which his thought evolved took him increasingly 
in an anthropological direction as he became more aware of the importance of religion 
as an influence on social solidarity, and more receptive to the symbolic significance of 
gifts in the reinforcement of identification with collectivities. Among modern writers 
this integration of sociological and anthropological perspectives can be found 
particularly prominently in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, for example in his analysis of 
the ‘absolute solidarity’ (1999: 62) to be detected among members of immigrant 
communities whose shared experiences of discrimination and disadvantage promote 
the language not of ‘I’ but of ‘We’. Anthropological thinking also directs attention to 
the way in which social groups are often represented as ‘natural’ and likened to 
biological entities. 
 
A rather different perspective has originated from women’s studies, where writers 
have sought to question how certain solidarities come to be imposed, and how certain 
groups of people come to be spoken for by others. The question ‘Who is this “we”?’ 
(Godway and Finn 1994) highlights the way in which women frequently find 
themselves committed to various roles, for example as members of communities in 
which they are expected to perform caring duties. Social solidarity can thus include 
relationships characterised by obligations or bonds (Blokland 2003), ties of 
interdepence from which  it is very hard to escape. These relationships are typically 
informal, and provide a form of social lubrication through the pattern of give and take 
of support, both material and emotional. It is evident that such relationships have not 
been completely displaced by the development of welfare states, which tend to 
practise solidarity on the more formalised basis of entitlements to support requiring 
contributions to social insurance schemes. Feminist scholars have been among those 
to explore the logic of formal welfare state arrangements  and the uneasy relationship 
between these arrangements and patterns of informal ‘family solidarity’ (Knijn and 
Komter 2004). These arguments are linked to the feminist case for more radical 
conceptions of citizenship rooted in ‘a politics of solidarity in difference’ (Lister 
1997: 80), and which do not assign women to supposedly ‘natural’ feminine roles.     
 
There has also been much learned about social solidarity in the writings of historians 
of the welfare state. Peter Baldwin’s account of The Politics of Social Solidarity 
highlights the importance of social class configurations in the explanation of how 
some welfare states came to embody more generous provision than others. His 
argument is that ‘Solidarity is the child of interdependence, although not of 
interdependence alone’ (Baldwin 1990: 33). Parallel to this account is that provided 
by Abram de Swaan which charts the ‘informal togetherness’ of the mutual aid 
societies that emerged as another way for populations to share risks . This analysis 
incorporates ideas drawn from the study of ‘the dilemmas of collective action which 
may only be solved by mutual trust or compulsion’ (1988: 145, 8). Legal and social 
policy scholars have also contributed to the understanding of social solidarity as it is 
expressed in the arrangements of welfare states and the rights and obligations of 
citizens. Maurizio Fererra’s analysis shows how ‘Solidarity is a rather elusive concept 
and a complex social good’ (2005: 19) which continues to present a challenge to 
policy-makers in the European Union as they attempt to move beyond the legacy of 
the different national arrangements that have grown up in the various member states. 
Alongside this, Putnam’s work discussed above exemplifies the useful point of 
connection between sociology and political science.   
 
Another influence on sociological thinking about social solidarity has come from 
economics, and in particular game theory. It is widely recognised that solidarity is 
necessary if collective interests are to be secured, for example in the context of a 
strike. Jon Elster’s observation that ‘By acting together the members of a class can 
obtain more than they could by acting in isolation’ (1985: 347) comes in the context 
of his discussion of Marx’s theory of social classes, but the analytical value of 
approaching individual and collective behaviour in these terms has diverse 
applications . Elster himself has argued this in his analysis of the transition to post-
communist arrangements in Eastern Europe, where ‘the societal conflicts that 
typically occur within post-communist societies are of a nature other than class 
conflicts’ (Elster et al 1998: 247, emphasis in original). Elster’s collaborator, Claus 
Offe, elsewhere speaks of the ‘extreme “unbrotherliness” of market relationships’ and 
their ‘“desolidarizing” effect’ (1996: 137), noting the tensions inherent in the actions 
of governments in post-communist societies as they sought to promote an ethos of 
solidarity among citizens while simultaneously fostering a transition to more market-
based economic relations. The interests that a person has as a member of a collectivity 
require the exercise of some restraint on the interests that they pursue as an individual. 
John Goldthorpe (2000) has argued that there is a long history of sociological analysis 
of rational action, and that ideas in this tradition that engage with developments in 
economic thinking merit serious consideration. The sociology-economics interface 
also features in Nan Lin’s (2001) analysis of social capital which explores 
homophilous and heterophilous interactions in social networks characterised by 
similarity or difference as alternative sources of solidarity.   
 
Proposition 4: Social solidarity can sometimes be associated with social problems as 
well as with desirable social outcomes. Like the associated term ‘community’, social 
solidarity is typically treated as desirable, and its absence regarded as something 
problematic. Nevertheless, there are aspects of social solidarity that are not 
necessarily desirable. One of these is its association with social exclusion. Social 
solidarity is a characteristic of groups whose members share a consciousness of 
having something in common. This may be membership of a formal organization, or a 
less formal shared identification with a particular locality, or a nation state, but in all 
cases membership implies a distinction between members and others, that is, between 
insiders and outsiders. This is not necessarily a problem, but where the exclusion of 
outsiders extends to restrict opportunities for them to join the group, and extends 
further to the stigmatisation of outsiders, the social solidarity of a group can be 
associated with discrimination. This point has been made about the more extreme 
forms of what Putnam calls ‘bonding’ social capital, such as the strongly-held in-
group consciousness and hostility to others found in divided societies, but the notion 
of the superiority of the groups to which one belongs is present more widely. Martin 
Albrow has developed this point by arguing that ‘the ideal of solidarity is…. in an 
important sense anti-social’ (1999: 25). Nationalism provides a good example of the 
potential of solidarity to promote co-operation within groups but conflict between 
them, but the point applies to all forms of identity politics.  
 
A second way in which social solidarity can be associated with social problems is 
where it takes the form of coercion on members to behave in ways that they would not 
have freely chosen. Craig Calhoun’s discussion of the ‘common bonds’ of community 
as loaded with the expectations of other community members gives the relationships 
of social solidarity the force of ‘moral obligations’ (1983: 92). Such tensions come to 
the fore during times of conflict when, for example, the solidarity of trade union 
members is tested during a strike. Jack Metzgar’s study of the US steel strike of 1959 
includes the comment that ‘disciplined unity was the source of union power’ (2000: 
163), because here as in other such conflicts the success of the strategy requires that 
members put the good of the group ahead of individual self-interest, and that people’s 
behaviour is monitored to ensure compliance. Pressure to conform to community 
expectations can also be found in more routine aspects of social life, however, as 
feminist researchers have argued in relation to expectations on women to carry out 
caring responsibilities as an expression of kinship solidarity. Such relationships can be 
experienced as ‘too close for comfort’ (Mason 1999: 156). Another example of 
solidarity being problematic in this respect is where opportunities for members to 
leave a group are restricted, such as when young people are discouraged from 
pursuing educational or career opportunities by this course of action being portrayed 
as a form of disloyalty to the group to whom they have certain obligations.  
 
In the extreme, mental illness can be an outcome of social solidarity where it is 
experienced as psychological pressure by group members. This argument has been 
made by Nancy Scheper-Hughes, whose study of rural Ireland found ‘a strong sense 
of community solidarity’ operating ‘at the expense of the individual’ (2001: 314-5), or 
at least at the expense of those individual members of the community who were 
psychologically vulnerable. Social solidarity is associated with supportive 
arrangements for members of a group, but only rarely are these arrangements on terms 
of their own choosing. It is a prominent theme of numerous studies that social 
solidarity should not be romanticised. The tendency to emphasise the idealised, 
positive dimensions of ‘friendliness, togetherness, closeness’ (Dicks 2000: 239) 
directs attention away from the more negative aspects of pressures on individuals to 
conform to approved modes of behaviour, and to prioritise the interests of the group 
over other concerns that an individual may have. Furthermore, individuals can find 
themselves pulled in different directions by the demands of different collectivities to 
which they belong. A typical person belongs to a number of different groups, and 
there are bound to be occasions when an individual has to prioritise. The notion that 
family and kinship responsibilities deserve priority over other commitments is a 
deeply-entrenched one, expressed in the idea that ‘families come first’, but other 
groups such as circles of friends or religious, political or community organizations 
compete for an individual’s time and resources, and also deploy the language of 
solidarity to make demands on members. Solidarity is also emphasised as an 
underlying principle of state welfare arrangements, even though the give and take 
involved between members of welfare states is a relationship between strangers (Lees 
1998). There is continuing interest in the connection between the evolving 
arrangements relating to welfare state membership and the more informal patterns of 
solidarity between people known personally to each other.   
 
Proposition 5: The nature and causes of social solidarity are matters of important on-
going debate. The concerns of the early sociologists to explore the foundations of 
social order and the potential for re-ordering social relationships remain influential in 
setting the sociological agenda. In the 21st century there are powerful voices 
expressing concern about the supposed decline of social solidarity, and sociologists 
have a role to play in contributing to debates about the emergence of new forms of 
social solidarity, and related debates about how far these can be fostered. Just as 
Durkheim saw it as important for his sociological analysis to offer solutions to the 
problems that his analysis had identified, contemporary sociologists are involved in 
discussions about viable forms of social organization. Durkheim’s own solutions 
advocated the development of occupational associations, which changes in the worlds 
of both work and welfare provision have transcended, but his identification of the 
broad sphere of civil society as vital to the integration of individuals into wider 
collectivities continues to frame the debate. Putnam’s (2000) examination of the 
prospects of the revival of community fits this perspective, for example, as does the 
wider literature on what is variously discussed as civil society, the third sector, non-
governmental organizations, or (most vague of all) the sphere of informal social 
relationships.        
 
These debates are about much more than terminology. First of all they also concern 
what motivates people to co-operate with others in solidaristic social relationships. It 
was noted above that one approach derived from game theory and founded on the 
assumption of rational action seeks to analyse collective behaviour in terms of 
people’s calculations of what is in their interests. The social insurance schemes 
designed to protect individuals and their families against unemployment, health and 
other risks that are at the heart of welfare states can be understood as a collective 
arrangement in which it is rational for individuals to participate. Without such 
collective schemes, the costs of prolonged periods of unemployment or ill-health 
would be prohibitive for most people and so it makes sense for these costs to be 
shared because even though many individuals will contribute more money than they 
receive from the scheme, no one knows in advance who will come to need 
unemployment or health assistance. From this point of view, it is rational to enter into 
solidary relationships. Michael Hechter’s (1987) analysis emphasises the way in 
which social solidarity makes sense to participants as something which benefits them. 
A very different approach is offered by writers who associate solidarity with altruistic 
motives, that is, something entered into by people who are in a distinct mindset from 
the calculation of individual interest. According to Mary Douglas, ‘solidarity is only 
gesturing when it involves no sacrifice’ (1987: 4), and from this point of view people 
participate in solidaristic behaviour because it is the right thing to do. This line of 
analysis emphasises the importance of morality and duty rather than self-interest. It 
also highlights the importance of rituals in reminding people of their membership of 
the group and their obligations to their fellow members to obey group norms. 
 
A second matter of on-going debate is the very nature of social solidarity itself. The 
double-sided character of social solidarity, whereby what Norbert Elias has called 
‘chains of interdependencies’ (1974: xix) are both empowering and constraining, is 
neatly captured by the way in which it is described both as a form of social ‘glue’ and 
as a social ‘lubricant’. Put another way, social solidarity binds people together but it 
also puts people in touch with others who can be trusted despite not being like them in 
every respect. In Putnam’s (2000) terms, it can be either ‘bonding’ or ‘bridging’. It is 
not surprising that these two elements are in tension with each other, because glue and 
lubricants serve very different purposes. Which of these two aspects comes to the fore 
depends very much on context. In some situations, appeals to solidarity bind people 
together by reminding them of what characteristics they have in common. Examples 
of this can be found in diverse social phenomena ranging from the macro to the micro 
levels; they may be whole societies whose members are united by nationalistic 
sentiments, or they may be individual families comprising perhaps as few as two or 
three people. In other contexts, the lubricating quality of social solidarity is more in 
evidence, where reference to a shared objective or point of connection reminds people 
of what they have in common despite their very real differences in terms of social 
class, gender, age, ethnicity or other features. Social movements made up of 
heterogeneous elements have to highlight their common goal and the strength that is 
brought by these diverse elements coming together, and being able to achieve more 
than they could as separate entities. Poland’s Solidarity movement provides a 
powerful example of different elements being brought together by a common purpose, 
although it also illustrates that a movement primarily held together by a common 
enemy (in this case Poland’s communist system) is likely to fall apart once that 
common enemy disappears. The general point is that it is helpful to analyse solidarity 
and schism together (Lockwood 1992). 
 
The temporal aspects of social solidarity also merit attention. Solidarity is an unstable 
phenomenon that oscillates between periods of relative quiescence and of intense 
expression during events such as strikes, revolutions, and religious ceremonies. 
Durkheim’s term ‘collective effervescence’ (1976: xvi) captures solidarity’s mercurial 
quality by describing periodic bursts of intense feelings of shared purpose that bring 
people together. The other side of this is the difficulty of maintaining consistently 
high levels of commitment to the common good as a matter of routine. Solidarity is 
generally understood as a matter of long-term commitment, because as Durkheim 
recognised it provides a basis for durable social relationships that survive fluctuations 
in people’s circumstances, during which they will be sometimes net recipients of 
support, and sometimes net contributors of support to others. Solidarity requires 
commitment to stay with these relationships in both situations. Finally it is instructive 
methodologically that surveys find people more ready to identify their contributions 
to the support of others than they are to acknowledge their receipt of support from 
others (Widegren 1997), even though in principle there ought to be a balance between 
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